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Appendix C | Risk Framework Comparisons

In the 2024 AI Assurance Technology Market Report, we present an original framework to categorise and describe risks resulting from the development and deployment of AI.

That framework was developed with the purposes of the report in mind, but it was not cherry-picked to only correspond to existing AI Assurance Technology solutions; instead, it seeks to give a comprehensive overview of known and expected AI-related risks.

In order to validate the coverage and sensibility of our framework, we consulted the existing literature and compared risk categorisations from diverse sources with the categories we produced.

We relied on some of these sources in developing the framework and added others to the comparison afterwards. Table 1 gives an overview of the frameworks we encountered in the literature.

Table 2 compares a few selected frameworks with our framework, finding that our categorisation is able to capture the risks identified by other authors. Given the large volume of AI-related risk analyses and discussions published in recent years, we cannot claim that our overview below is completely exhaustive.

However, we would argue that its coverage of a decent sample of prominent AI risk frameworks is a decent basis for validating and cross-checking the comprehensiveness of our framework.

Table 1: Comparison of a few prominent AI Risk Frameworks

SourceCategoriesMain dimension for categorisationTime periodType of AIFocus Area(s)
Our framework (2024)Misuse of AI system
- Physical harm
- Digital harm
- Informational harm
Internal technical failure of AI system
- Misalignment
- Unreliability
Vulnerability of AI system to exogenous interference
- Natural hazard or accident
- Adversarial attack (Socioeconomic disruption) (Drivers of risk and vulnerability)
Pathways to harm or lossNow and prospectiveAll / UndefinedComprehensive, with a bias towards business or economic risk
U.S. NIST (2023)Valid and reliable
Safe
Secure and resilient
Accountable and transparent
Explainable and interpretable
Privacy enhanced
Fair with their harmful biases managed
AI characteristics to prevent harmNow and prospective (with adaptations)All / UndefinedComprehensive (harms affecting “individuals, groups, organisations, communities, society, the environment, and the planet”)
UNSG (2023)Individuals
Groups
Society
Economy
(Eco)systems
Values and norms
Technical limitations
Inappropriate use
Human-machine interaction
Catastrophic risks
Primary: Targets of harm
Secondary, for illustration: Pathways to harm and Severity of harm (inconsistent)
Now and prospectiveAll / UndefinedComprehensive
EU AI Act (2024)Unacceptable risk
High risk
(Systemic risk)
Moderate risk
No risk x
SeverityNow (current systems and areas of application are categorised)All / UndefinedComprehensive
Fjeld et al. (2020)Privacy
Accountability
Safety and security
Transparency and explainability
Fairness and non-discrimination
Human control of technology
Professional responsibility
Promotion of human values
AI characteristics to prevent harmNow and prospective (with adaptations)All / UndefinedComprehensive (synthesis of AI principles documents released by governments as well as international, multi-stakeholder, civil society, and corporate actors)
Wirtz et al. (2022)Technological, data, and analytical
Informational and communicational
Economic
Social
Ethical
Legal and regulatory
Sector of harmNow and prospectiveAll / UndefinedComprehensive (systematic review and synthesis of academic AI risk frameworks)
Hendrycks (n.d.)Malicious use
AI Race
Organizational Risks
Rogue AIs
Pathways to harm?Mainly prospectiveAdvanced ML-based AICatastrophic risks
Maham & Küspert (2023)Unreliability Risks
- Discrimination and Stereotype –Reproduction
- Misinformation and Privacy –Violations
- Accidents
Misuse Risks
- Cyber Crime
- Biosecurity Threats
- Politically Motivated Misuse
Systemic Risks
- Economic Power Centralisation and Inequality
- Ideological Homogenization from Value Embedding
- Disruptions from Outpaced Societal Adaptation
Pathways to harm?
Relevance of specific hazards (for selection of subcategories)
Now and prospectiveGeneral-purpose AIComprehensive (?)
Focus on societal risks (?)
Shelby et al. (2023)Representational harms
- Stereotyping social groups
- Demeaning social groups
- Erasing social groups
- Alienating social groups
- Denying people opportunity to self-identify
- Reifying essentialist social categories
Allocative harms
- Opportunity loss
- Economic loss
Quality of service harms
- Alienation
- Increased labor
- Service/benefit loss
Interpersonal harms
- Loss of agency
- Tech-facilitated violence
- Diminished health and well-being
- Privacy violations
Social system harms
- Information harms
- Cultural harms
- Political and civic harms
- Socio-economic harms
- Environmental harms
Type of harmNowAlgorithmic systemsSociotechnical harms
Focus on harms that arise directly from the interaction of humans with algorithmic systems
Miles et al. 2018Digital Security
Physical Security
Political Security
Sector of harmNow and prospectiveML-based AI with (current or near-future capabilities)Misuse risks
Katzman et al. 2023Reifying social groups
Demeaning social groups
Erasing social groups
Stereotyping social groups
Denying people the ability to self-identify
Types of harmNow and prospective (?)Imagine-tagging systemsRepresentational harms (bias, discrimination, etc)
Weidinger et al. 2022Discrimination, Hate speech and Exclusion
Information Hazards
Misinformation Harms
Malicious Uses
Human-Computer Interaction Harms
Environmental and Socioeconomic harms
Pathways to harmNow and prospectiveLarge Language ModelsEthical and social risks
Bommasani 2022Inequity and fairness
Misuse
Environment
Legality
Economics
Ethics of scale
Sectors of harm/impactNow and prospectiveFoundation modelsSocietal impact (comprehensive)
Slaughter et al. 2021Design flaws
- faulty inputs
- faulty conclusions
- failure to adequately test
Systemic effects
- by facilitating proxy discrimination
- by enabling surveillance capitalism
- by inhibiting competition in markets
Causes of harmNowAlgorithmic decision-making in high-stakes spheresEconomic justice; focused on harms that can be addressed by FTC regulators
Smuha 2021Individual harm
Collective harm
Societal harm
- Equality
- Democracy
- Rule of law
Targets of harmNow and prospectiveAll / UndefinedComprehensive, but analysis focuses on societal harms
Shevlane et al. 2023 (pdf)Misuse
Misalignment
They also list a number of distinct risky capabilities, and give examples of risks resulting from each of those capabilities
Pathways to harmProspectiveFrontier AI modelsFocus on Extreme risks

Table 2: Mapping existing AI Risk Frameworks to the framework developed for this report

Categories in our frameworkHendrycks (n.d.)Maham & Küspert (2023)UNSG (2023)U.S. NIST (2023)Shelby et al. (2023)Wirtz et al. (2022)
Misuse–Physical HarmMalicious useMisuse Risks–Biosecurity ThreatsInappropriate use (not explicitly discussed)
Catastrophic risks (LAWS)
Secure and resilient
Explainable and interpretable (requirement for mitigating this risk (??))
Interpersonal harms–Diminished health and well-being (not mentioned explicitly)Technological, data, and analytical
Ethical (LAWS)
Misuse–Cyber HarmMalicious useMisuse Risks–Cyber Crime
Misuse Risks–Politically Motivated Misuse
Inappropriate use (not explicitly discussed)Secure and resilient
Explainable and interpretable (requirement for mitigating this risk (??))
Interpersonal harms–Tech-facilitated violence
Interpersonal harms–Privacy violations
Social system harms–Political and civic harms (surveillance)
Technological, data, and analytical
Social (surveillance, privacy)
Ethical (unethical use of data)
Misuse–Informational HarmMalicious useMisuse Risks–Politically Motivated MisuseInappropriate use (explicitly discussed)
Catastrophic risks (mass surveillance)
Secure and resilient
Accountable and transparent
Explainable and interpretable (requirement for mitigating this risk (??))
Interpersonal harms–Loss of agency (?)
Interpersonal harms–Tech-facilitated violence
Interpersonal harms–Diminished health and well-being
Social system harms–Information harms
Social system harms–Political and civic harms (propaganda, manipulation)
Technological, data, and analytical
Informational and communicational
Internal technical Failure–UnreliabilityOrganizational Risks
Rogue AIs
Unreliability Risks–Discrimination and Stereotype Reproduction
Unreliability Risks–Misinformation and Privacy Violations
Unreliability Risks–Accidents
Technical limitationsValid and reliable
Safe
Accountable and transparent
Explainable and interpretable (requirement for mitigating this risk (?))
Privacy enhanced (prevent accidental data leak)
Fair with their harmful biases managed (prevent unfair outcomes due to imbalanced or insufficient data)
Representational harms (all subcategories)
Allocative harms (all subcategories)
Quality of service harms (all subcategories)
Interpersonal harms–Diminished health and well-being
Interpersonal harms–Privacy violations
Social system harms–Information harms (unintended hallucinations)
Social system harms–Cultural harms (bias against non-majority cultures)
Social system harms–Socio-economic harms (financial crash due to unreliability in AI-powered financial traders)
Technological, data, and analytical
Social (discrimination)
Ethical (discrimination, harmful accidents)
Internal technical Failure–MisalignmentRogue AIsUnreliability Risks–Accidents
Systemic Risks–Ideological Homogenization from Value Embedding
Systemic Risks–Disruptions from Outpaced Societal Adaptation
Catastrophic risks (uncontrollable AI)Safe
Accountable and transparent
Explainable and interpretable (requirement for mitigating this risk (?))
Fair with their harmful biases managed (prevent unfair outcomes due to misspecified reward functions)
Interpersonal harms–Loss of agency
Interpersonal harms–Diminished health and well-being
Social system harms–Information harms (unintended homogenization of the information environment as a side-result of algorithms pursuing some other goal)
Social system harms–Cultural harms (unintended marginalisation of some cultures as a side-result of algorithms pursuing some other goal)
Technological, data, and analytical
Informational and communicational (filter bubbles as an unintentioned side-effect of misaligned recommender algorithms)
Ethical (omitted values; difficulty of encoding human values)
Vulnerability to exogenous interference–AccidentN/AN/AN/ASecure and resilientN/AN/A
Vulnerability to exogenous interference–AttackN/AUnreliability Risks–Accidents
Unreliability Risks–Misinformation and Privacy Violations
N/ASecure and resilient
Privacy enhanced (prevent data theft)
N/ATechnological, data, and analytical
Social (privacy)
(Socioeconomic disruption)Malicious use
AI Race
Systemic Risks–Economic Power Centralisation and Inequality
Systemic Risks–Disruptions from Outpaced Societal Adaptation
Human-machine interactionPrivacy enhanced (prevent excessive data collection by AI developers)
Fair with their harmful biases managed (prevent unfair disparities in access to AI services)
Interpersonal harms–Loss of agency (??)
Interpersonal harms–Privacy violations (excessive data collection by AI developers)
Social system harms–Socio-economic harms
Social system harms–Environmental harms
Economic (e.g., inequality)
Social (e.g., unemployment)
Ethical (meaning crisis)
Legal and regulatory (copyright issues)
(Drivers of risk)AI Race
Organizational Risks
Systemic Risks–Disruptions from Outpaced Societal Adaptation
Mentioned throughout
Human-machine interactionAccountable and transparent
Explainable and interpretable
Fair with their harmful biases managed (prevent unfair outcomes due to how humans interact with AI-generated information)
Representational harms (those harms are made worse because of automation bias and system opacity)Technological, data, and analytical (opacity, oversight)
Social (human-machine interaction, opacity and lack of public understanding)
Ethical (difficulty of encoding human values)
Legal and regulatory (accountability, unpredictability, opacity)
No matchN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A
NoteCategories serve mostly illustrative purposes; the authors’ primary approach to categorisation separates hazards by target / vulnerability (individuals, groups, society, economy, (eco)system, norms and values)Categories describe characteristics to ensure trustworthy AI; we matched them with hazard categories by asking which type of hazard each characteristic is aiming to address.Categories are broad, encompassing several risks, hence the many-to-many matching.